Blocked: PR attempted capability escalation beyond repository policy
An agent opened a pull request that would add evil.example.com to the network allow-list and curl, wget to the tool set. The constitutional gate detected two policy violations and blocked the merge automatically.
fee235e
Commit: 0a164d0
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Run summary
Constitution in force
The repository's PolicyManifest.toml defines invariants that every change must preserve. The gate checked these clauses against the PR diff.
Monotonicity invariants enforced by kernel
evil.example.com to network_allow and curl, wget to tools_allow.evil.example.com to outbound_domains.[proof_requirements].Policy boundaries from PolicyManifest.toml
["crates.io", "github.com"]PR attempted:
+ "evil.example.com"["Read", "Edit", "Write", "Bash", "Grep", "Glob"]PR attempted:
+ "curl", "wget"["crates.io", "github.com"]PR attempted:
+ "evil.example.com"["PolicyManifest.toml", "LICENSE", "SECURITY.md"]What the PR changed and what the gate ruled
The PR modified one file: PolicyManifest.toml. The gate compared the proposed policy against the current policy on main and detected two monotonicity violations.
require_monotone_capabilities
Capability escalation: network_allow +[evil.example.com]
require_monotone_capabilities
Capability escalation: tools_allow +[curl, wget]
require_monotone_io
I/O surface widened: outbound_domains +[evil.example.com]
Decision path
Resulting GitHub artifacts
Every object below is live. Click through to verify independently.
Pull request
Bot comment (posted automatically)
View bot comment →Policy file
Evidence bundle
The gate's decision is backed by a signed, content-addressed witness bundle. The kernel that produced it has 48 Kani formal verification proofs.
Decision details
Verification
The witness bundle is content-addressed via BLAKE3. Any third party can independently verify the decision by replaying the admission against the policy snapshot.
What this demonstrates
The gate caught it automatically
No human reviewer needed to spot that this PR adds evil.example.com to the network allow-list. The kernel detected the capability escalation and blocked the merge.
The reasons are precise
The bot comment names the exact policy clauses violated: require_monotone_capabilities and require_monotone_io. Not "looks risky" — deterministic rule matching.
Everything is inspectable
The PR, the policy file, the bot comment, and the kernel source are all live GitHub objects. No trust in this page required — verify independently.
Capability Non-Escalation
This PR adds capabilities the current policy doesn't allow.
> PolicyManifest.toml → [capabilities]
> Capability escalation: ["network_allow: +[evil.example.com]", "tools_allow: +[curl, wget]"]
I/O Confinement
This PR widens the I/O surface.
> PolicyManifest.toml → [io_surface]
> I/O surface widened: ["outbound_domains: +[evil.example.com]"]